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Mo SPEECH MO PROBLEMS:
THE REGULATION OF STUDENT SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE
AND THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH IN
BELL v ITAWAMBA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD
MichaelBegovic
I. INTRODUCTION
When Taylor Bell, a senior at Itawamba Agricultural School, learned
about sexual misconduct allegations that female students had made
against two of his teachers, he turned to his rap music to vent his
frustration and shed light on the problem.' He did not anticipate that he
would eventually be expelled for the rap song he created and uploaded
to the Internet on his own time. 2 Although Bell did not access the rap
song at school or intend to cause any harm, school officials determined
that Bell's song contained lyrics that were threatening,
harassing, and
3
intimidating and therefore, warranted an expulsion.
Taylor Bell's story is not an uncommon one. Students regularly use
the Internet as a platform to discuss school-related matters, and this
trend is only growing. 4 The Internet has changed how students
communicate by creating new channels of communication that operate
outside of school grounds accessed by anyone at any time. Students can
now reach the whole student community with ideas and messages by
clicking a button. Consequently, students operating off-campus can
impact the school community in a way never before possible. Herein
lies the dilemma: with potential threats and problems originating offcampus, schools now have a greater interest in monitoring and
regulating off-campus speech but must do so in a way that does not
exceed the bounds of their legal authority. 5 The question of how far that
authority the
reaches
is unclear.
Underlying
this the
uncertainty
is a clash
between
free speech
rights of
students and
need for schools
to

1. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 282-89 (5th Cir. 2014), reh'g en banc
granted, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cit. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016).
2. Id. at 286-89.

3. Id. at 288-89.
4. Emily Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials and the
Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BuLL OF RTS. J. 591, 591 (2011) (alluding to studies
which found that ninety-three percent of middle school and high school students use the Internet, and
that nearly sixty-three percent of them discuss school-related topics).
5. See Daniel Marcus-Toll, Note, Tinker Gone Viral: Diverging Threshold Tests for Analyzing
School Regulation of Off-Campus DigitalStudent Speech, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 3395, 3397-98 (2011)
(online threats, such as cyberbullying and violence, are a cause for serious concern for today's schools).
6. Id. at 3399 (arguing that it is uncertain whether and when schools may lawfully restrict
speech by students that occurs off-campus).
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eliminate potential threats and to protect the school community. The
advent of the Internet has obfuscated traditional physical boundaries that
historically defined legal protections for students and the limits of
7
It has forced a
authority for schools regulating student speech.
reexamination of the legal standards and constitutional protections in
play when courts deal with student free speech. Not surprisingly,
schools now have more opportunities and tools to monitor students'
online activities, and have tested the limits of their authority by using
these new tools to do so. This has led to a spike in litigation amidst
growing conflict. The Supreme Court has "provided little guidance to
public schools on this issue," 9 and lower court decisions have been
inconsistent.10 Consequently, public schools are left in a precarious
position, as they are faced with considerable uncertainty regarding the
limits of their authority to regulate off-campus student speech."
Part II of this Casenote provides an overview of the relevant case law
dealing with student free speech. Specifically, Part II explains the
standard formulated in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, a case involving student speech occurring on-campus
The Tinker standard remains the preferred standard when courts are
dealing with student free speech cases, even when that speech is offcampus. 12 Part II also sets the backdrop by discussing the problems that
arise with student free speech in the digital age, and the countless legal
conflicts that have resulted from this phenomenon. Part III of this note
elaborates on Taylor Bell's story and examines the Fifth Circuit's en
banc decision to uphold Taylor Bell's expulsion in Bell v. Itawamba
County School Board on the grounds that Taylor Bell's speech was not
protected by the First Amendment. Finally, Part IV of this Casenote
argues that the Fifth Circuit's decision was incorrect because it
7. See Waldman, supra note 4, at 619 (noting that in the pre-Intemet age, courts were more
easily able to rely on the geographic on-campus/off-campus division when analyzing schools' authority
over off-campus speech); see also Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (inholding
that a school could not punish students for distributing a satirical newspaper off-campus, the court relied
on the off-campus location of the speech).
8. Somini Sengupta, Warily, Schools Watch Students on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/1 0/29/technology/some-schools-extend-surveillance-of-studentsbeyond-campus.html? r=0 (one school district paid Geo Listening, a technology company, $40,500 to
monitor social media posts).
9. Shannon M. Raley, Tweaking Tinker: Redefining an Outdated Standardfor the Internet Era,
59 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 773, 774 (2011).
10. Id. at 776 (noting that lower courts are unsure of what constitutes a "substantial disruption"
under the Tinker standard).
11. Id. at 774 (noting that inconsistent lower court decisions have provided little guidance to
schools).
12. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (noting that of the six
circuit courts to decide whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech, five have held that Tinker applies
to off-campus speech).
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erroneously applied Tinker's less protective standard to Bell's offcampus speech. More broadly, Part IV of this Casenote discusses the
problems with extending Tinker's less protective standard to off-campus
speech and argues that Tinker should never extend to off-campus
speech. Part IV concludes by advocating for a more protective standard
when off-campus speech is at issue--one in which a school board's
decision can only be justified if it proves that the speech poses a grave
and substantial danger. This standard supplies adequate protection to
students while still allowing schools to address potential threats. It
strikes the right balance because, unlike Tinker, a student's speech is not
subject to a school board's reasonable interpretation. Instead, this
standard places a higher burden on the school to show that the offcampus speech at issue posed a grave and substantial danger. By
requiring schools to meet this heightened burden, off-campus speech
will not be quelled in a way that runs afoul of basic First Amendment
principles.
While lower courts have been applying Tinker to off-campus speech
under certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has yet to decide
whether the Tinker standard applies to off-campus speech. In denying
certiorari in Bell, the Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to resolve
this question. To this end, the Supreme Court should take advantage of
the next opportunity it has to hear a case involving off-campus student
speech and declare that Tinker's less protective standard does not apply
to student speech originating off-campus.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Birth andEvolution of Student Free Speech
The First Amendment provides that, "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech." 13 This limitation applies not only to
the federal government, but to state actors as well,' including school
boards. 15 While it is well-established that students do not, "shed their

13. U.S. CONST. amend I.
14. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (noting that the First Amendment, through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applies to state actors, in addition to the federal
government).
15. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from forbidding the teaching of a foreign language to young
students); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. Of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961) (invalidating a decision
to expel a student at a public school without specific charges as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and noting that, without sufficient education, the plaintiffs would not be able to earn an
adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and
responsibilities of good citizens).
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' 16
constitutional rights to freedom of speech at the schoolhouse gate,"
students do not enjoy the same rights when they enter the school
setting. 17
The first noteworthy attempt to formulate a standard for student free
speech cases came from the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Disttrict. In Tinker, two high school

students 18 challenged their suspensions, claiming that the school board's
decision to suspend them violated their First Amendment right to

freedom of speech. 19 The two students in Tinker wore black armbands

to school in protest of the Vietnam War. After the students refused to
comply with the newly-adopted school policy banning such armbands,

they were sent home and subsequently suspended.
The Tinker Court reaffirmed the principle that students, like any other
regular citizens, possess fundamental constitutional rights that the state
cannot infringe upon. 22 However, the Tinker Court also recognized that

the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of school officials to prescribe and control
conduct in the school. In lieu of these concerns, the Supreme Court
adopted a framework for examining First Amendment
claims inside of a
24
school setting, known as the Tinker standard.
Under Tinker, a school may restrict student speech or expression that

would either: (a) cause a substantial and material interference in the
25
operation of the school or (b) collide with the rights of other students.
The Tinker Court noted that this protection is ubiquitous in the school
setting, applying not only to the classroom, but to a student, "when he is
in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours."2 6 Applying this framework to the students' speech at

16. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (citing Meyer, 262
U.S. 390).
17. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (the constitutional rights
of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings).
18. Mary Beth Tinker filed an amicus brief in support of Appellants/Plaintiffs. See Brief for
Mary Beth Tinker as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d
379 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-60264), 2015 WL 6107618.
19. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 511.
23. Id.
24. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
25. Id.(Students are free to express their opinions on school property, if they do so without
"materially and substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school" and without "colliding with the rights of other students.").
26. Id.(noting that student communication is a vital part of the education process; it is not
confined to the supervised and ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom.).
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issue in Tinker, the Supreme Court found no evidence supporting the
school board's claim that the black armbands caused a substantial
interference with the school's activities. 27 Instead, the Supreme Court
inferred that the school's decision was based on its desire to suppress an
unpopular opinion and avoid the resulting controversy. 28 Although the
Tinker Court did not explicitly suggest or indicate that the framework
should apply to student speech occurring off-campus, 2 9 many lower
courts have used it when analyzing student speech originating off- as
well as on-campus.30
B. Supreme Court Carves Out Exceptions to Tinker
The Supreme Court, after Tinker, carved out a number of exceptions
to the standard by identifying certain types of speech that, based on
content, deserve less protection and consequently are not subject to the
Tinker framework. These exceptions include: (a) speech that is lewd or
vulgar; 3 1 (b) speech that occurs during a school-sponsored event if the
restriction on such speech is reasonably related to a pedagogical
concern; 32 and (c) speech that is reasonably viewed as promoting the use
of illegal drugs.
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court eschewed
27. Id. at 514 (noting that the armbands facilitated discussion outside of the classroom, but did
not interfere with the work or lead to disorder).
28. Id. at 510 (noting that other political symbols aimed at expressing a political opinion were
not suppressed).
29. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3395, 3407-08 (noting that while the wording in Tinker is
arguably broad enough to support application to the off-campus setting, the Tinker Court did not
expressly contemplate that possibility, instead harping on the "special characteristics of the school
environment"); see also Bell v. Itawamba County Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 291 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting
that Tinker did not decide under what circumstances a public school may regulate students' online, offcampus speech).
30. See, e.g., Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1065-67 (9th Cir. 2013)
(applying Tinker to a student who wrote about weapons on MySpace); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch.,
652 F.3d 565, 567-68, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying Tinker to a student who ridiculed and bullied a
classmate through a webpage); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44-45 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying Tinker
to a student who was barred from mnning for class secretary based on a derogatory blog the student
posted on a web site about a school principal).
31. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (distinguishing Fraserfrom
Tinker by pointing out that the speech at issue in Fraserinvolved "sexual content" while the speech at
issue in Tinker involved a political message; the Court held that a school can restrict lewd or vulgar
behavior without having to meet the Tinker standard).
32. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (holding that a school did not
violate a student's First Amendment right to freedom of speech when it censored content that a student
wanted to publish in the school newspaper and emphasizing that unlike Tinker, the restriction here was
"curricular" in nature, and consequently schools have more control and are awarded more deference).
33. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (upholding a school board's decision to
suspend a student for holding up a "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner during a school field trip.
Recognizing the state's compelling interest in deterring illegal drug use, the court found that speech
promoting illegal drug use conflicts with the school's goal of protecting students.).
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the Tinker framework and awarded more deference to schools because
the content of the speech in question fell into one of these narrow
categories. Furthermore, the Supreme Court recognized that schools
34
have a compelling interest in regulating certain categories of speech.
In all of these cases, the speech at issue was indisputably being
disseminated either on school grounds or at a school-sponsored event.
In fact, the Supreme Court has never heard a case involving a student's
off-campus free speech rights. These three cases, along with Tinker,
represent the full body of Supreme Court precedent with respect to
student free speech. 36 In them, the court drew an important distinction
between the political nature of the speech at issue in Tinker, 37 and the
nonpolitical nature of the speech at issue in the post-Tinker cases. 38 The
post-Tinker case law makes clear that school officials may restrict
certain forms of speech that would otherwise be protected outside of the
school setting. The justification for doing so is predicated on the idea
that the "special characteristics" 39 of a school environment remove the
protection that a student normally has in the public sphere. However, if
the speech does not fall under one of the post-Tinker categories, it is
subject to Tinker's more protective standard: a school must show that
either a substantial disruption was forecasted or that the speech collided
with the rights of other students.
C. Lower Courts Struggle with Off-Campus Student Speech
Although a state's decision to restrict a student's free speech can be
justified by either of two separate prongs under Tinker, the majority of
lower-court jurisprudence has arisen under the substantial disruption
Courts
haveclaim.
rarelyZ used
prong. free
second pronghave
when
evaluating
student's
speech
Somethecommentators
pointed
out thata

34. See Fraser,478 U.S. at 681 (schools have an interest in promoting "socially appropriate
behavior"); see also Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271 (In the curricular context, schools have an interest in
ensuring that students learn the intended academic lessons and that educational content is age
appropriate.). See also Morse, 551 U.S. at 407 (Schools have an interest in educating students about
illegal drug use.).
35. See Fraser,478 U.S. 675; see also Morse, 551 U.S. at 403; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260.
36. See Waldman, supranote 4, at 594.
37. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 at 509 (noting that the state,
"must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint").
38. See Fraser,478 U.S. at 680 (distinguishing sexually explicit speech from political speech).
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
40. Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the FirstAmendment, 53
LOY. L. REV. 355, 363-64 (2007). See also Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital
Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1042 (2008).
41. See Marcus-Toll, supranote 5, at 3409.
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the Supreme Court has not offered much guidance on application of the
Tinker standard. 42 This is due, in part, to the Supreme Court's
unwillingness to articulate a more precise definition of "substantial
disruption." 4 3 As a result, lower courts have had trouble applying this
44
prong consistently to cases involving a student's free speech rights,
promulgating varying threshold
standards for determining when speech
45
Tinker.
under
is protected
Lower courts are split on whether Tinker applies to student speech
that originates off school grounds but eventually finds its way into the
school. 6 In fact, lower courts employ a number of different approaches
when dealing with off-campus student speech. In Thomas v. Board of
Education, the Second Circuit decided that Tinker did not apply to a
satirical newspaper produced and sold after school hours and off school
property, 47 noting that, "while prior cases involved expression within the
school itself, all but an insignificant amount of relevant activity in this
48
case was deliberately designed to take place beyond the school gate.",
For the Second Circuit, the fact that the satirical newspaper and its
controversy found its way onto campus was not sufficient to lower the
standard that the government must meet for justifying suppression of
free speech in the public arena. 4 9 In other words, because the school
board was interfering with speech that did not occur on school grounds,
it had to justify suppression of the speech as if the speech were
occurring in the regular public sphere; the government could not avail
itself of the less protective standard embodied in the Tinker framework.
Most circuit courts that have dealt with student speech originating
off-campus have analyzed the speech under Tinker's substantial
disruption standard. 50 Some circuits applying Tinker to off-campus
speech have ostensibly established different threshold tests for
42. Id. at 3401.
43. Id.
44. See Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the FirstAmendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 63
FLA. L. REV. 395, 405 (2011) (noting that lower court decisions do not identify how a court should go
about determining whether a substantial disruption has occurred).
45. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3401 (noting that "lower courts have developed several
threshold standards for determining the circumstances under which the Tinker standard may permit
school regulation of off-campus speech),
46. Id. at3416-17.
47. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1979) (only an occasional article was
written within the school building after classes).
48. Id. at 1050.
49. Id. at 1050-51 (the court also opined that if the school had authority to punish the students for
making an off-campus newspaper, then it would also have the authority to punish a student for watching
an X rated film at home).
50. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that the
Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have concluded that Tinker applies to certain off-campus speech,
but that the Third and Fifth Circuits have left the question open).
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determining whether Tinker applies to off-campus speech, 5 1 while also
suggesting that Tinker's application to off-campus speech should have
some limitations. 52 The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that Tinker
applies to off-campus speech without any qualifications. 53 In Lavine v.
Blaine School District,the Ninth Circuit had to rule on a school board's
decision to temporarily expel a student who had written a poem off54
campus in which he meticulously described committing a shooting.
Without considering the possibility or argument that Tinker may not
apply to speech originating off-campus, the Ninth Circuit applied the
Tinker framework to determine if the school board's action was
permissible. 55 Viewing all of the factors surrounding the suspension,
including the student's behavior, the Court determined that the school
board's decision to expel the student was based on a reasonable
56 fear of a
substantial disruption and upheld the school board's decision.
Some commentators have posited that the likelihood a lower court
will apply Tinker is increased if the facts weigh in favor of a finding that
there was a substantial disruption. 57 Not surprisingly, many courts
employing Tinker's less protective standard still place a considerable
amount of weight on the off-campus origin of the speech. 58 Many
Courts will look at the origin of the speech when analyzing a school
board's decision under the substantial disruption prong. This factor is
51. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schools, 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding that Tinker
applied to a student who ridiculed a fellow student on MySpace because the speech had a "sufficient
nexus" to the school's pedagogical interests); S.J.W. v. Lee's Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777
(8th Cir. 2012) (Tinker applies to off-campus speech when it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech
will reach the school community).
52. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (noting that there is surely a limit to the scope of a high school's
interest in the order, safety, and well-being of students when the speech at issue originates outside the
schoolhouse gate); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that
while Tinker's schoolhouse gate is not construed solely on the bricks and mortar surrounding the school,
the concept of the school yard is not without boundaries and the reach of school authorities is not
without limits).
53. Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001).
54. Id. 983-87.
55. Id. at 988-89.
56. Id In doing so, the Ninth Circuit made clear that it was considering other factors besides the
poem--such as Lavine's suicidal thoughts that he had shared and a domestic dispute that was bothering
him-just as the school board had.
57. See Raley, supra note 9, at 789 (noting that although some courts are reserved about
applying Tinker to off-campus speech, it is more likely that a court will do so if the threat of a
substantial disruption exists).
58. See Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (noting that
"the lack of evidence, combined with the above findings regarding the out-of-school nature of the
speech, indicates that the plaintiff has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim").
59. See id. at 1088 (emphasizing that the evidence, combined with the out-of-school nature of the
speech, did not allow a school to expel a student for a web page made at home); see also Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that the school's decision to punish a
student for online activity he engaged in while at his grandmother's house would set a dangerous
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usually relevant when evaluating whether there was a substantial
disruption, and Tinker's framework is certainly flexible enough to
permit its consideration. Some courts have even gone so far as to
proclaim that a school's authority to regulate off-campus speech is much
more limited than its authority over on-campus speech, even if the
Tinker standard may still apply. 60 Nevertheless, the overwhelming
weight of authority has analyzed student speech under Tinker, regardless
of where the speech originated.61 In determining whether the Tinker
standard has been satisfied, lower courts have considered a plethora of
other factors. These factors include: (a) the identity of the speaker; 6 2 (b)
whether the speech was brought in by the speaker or a third party 63;
64 and
(c) whether the speech would meet the definition of a "true threat.
D. Regulation of Student Speech Is Tricky in the Internet Age
There are two colliding trends that underlie the debate over student
speech in the digital age-trends that complicate and inform the debate
moving forward.
They make regulation of student speech an
increasingly contentious yet important issue today. First, the number of
middle-school and high-school-age students using the Internet and social
65
media to discuss school-related topics is large and rapidly growing.
Second, recent school shootings, cyberbullying, and online threats are
all pressing issues that school administrators must deal with.6 6 Not
surprisingly, these problems have emboldened schools that want to test
the expanding limits of their regulatory authority 67by asserting more
control over student speech originating off-campus.
Schools continue
to push the bounds of their regulatory authority for a number of reasons,
including efforts to: (a) address threats made towards students and

precedent).
60. Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
61. Id. at 454.
62. See Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2000) (placing significant
weight on the mental issues that the speaker was experiencing).
63. See Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 457 (in invalidating a school board's decision, placing
significant weight on the fact that a satirical piece about a teacher was brought in by a third party and
not the speaker).
64. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 300-05 (5th Cir. 2014).
65. See Waldman, supra note 4, at 591 (alluding to studies which found that ninety-three percent
of middle school and high school students use the Internet, and that nearly sixty-three percent of them
discuss school-related topics).
66. See Marcus-Toll, supranote 5, at 3397-3400.
67. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (invalidating a school's
decision to punish a student who created a parody MySpace profile of his principal); see also Killion,
136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (invalidating a school's decision to punish a student who created a "top ten" list
that mocked a school official); Sengupta, supra note 8.
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school officials; (b) eliminate cyberbullying; and (c) limit conduct that
reflects poorly on the school. 68 The result has been a conflict between
free speech rights and school officials attempting to eliminate these
problems by testing the bounds of their authority. This conflict has led
to a growing number of legal disputes.
The emergence and exacerbation of school-related problems in the
Internet age complicates an age-old debate surrounding free speech in
the school setting: What is the role of public schools in shaping the
youth of our county and in imparting our principles and values to
children. 69 Few would argue that schools should not be tasked with
imparting democratic principles in a way that prepares students for civic
life. But in order to maintain order and safety, schools need to operate
as non-democratic entities by abridging certain liberties. 70 The resulting
paradox and the normative questions it raises are at the center of student
free speech conflicts; these fundamental questions will continue to
permeate student free speech cases and usually inform an individual's
opinion on specific student free speech cases. 7 1 In this sense, individual
views on how government should balance personal liberties with safety
and order may align with, and be an indicator of, opinions about student
free speech issues.
Cases involving a student's free speech rights fall under a number of
different sub-categories. Some of these cases involve cyberbullying, 72 a
serious concern for teachers and school administrators.
Another
subcategory of these cases involves students that may pose a threat to
the safety of the school and have expressed intent to harm the school or
its students in some way. 73 But the vast majority of these cases have
involved speech viewed as hostile towards a school official.74 The
68. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3397.
69. See Maureen Sullivan, Democratic Values in a Digitalized World: Regulating Internet
Speech in Schools to Further the EducationalMission, 96 MARQ. L. REv. 689, 696-697 (2012) (noting
that public schools are valued by society because they instill in students a common set of core principles
and values, such as respect, honesty, citizenship, responsibility, and integrity; public schools were
established to teach students how to exercise their democratic rights as citizens and cultivate a sense of
nationalism.); but see Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual
Development, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1271, 1275-76 (1991) (arguing that the role of public schools should not
be concerned with fostering a marketplace of ideas).
70. See Waldman, supra note 4, at 594 (describing the paradox in the following way: schools
have the important mission of educating each generation of new citizens so they will have the tools
necessary to preserve and protect tenants of democracy, but teachers need to take away some liberty in
order to maintain order in the classroom setting).
71. Id. at 595 (positing that the way in which one conceives the public schools' institutional role
necessarily will inform one's view of the extent to which students' constitutional rights should be
recognized).
72. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011).
73. See Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013).
74. Waldman, supranote 4, at 592 (noting that all of the cases dealing with Internet speech that
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Internet is the most commonly used platform for disseminating this type
of speech.7 5 Students ....
can now criticize, harass, embarrass,
and threaten
76
school officials online with ease and convenience.
This gossip can
spread like wildfire and usually comes to the attention of school
officials. As illustrated in the previous section, the new digital age of
"school gossip" has created problems for courts, blurring traditional
geographic boundaries they have historically relied on. 77 Additionally,
psychological research shows that hostility manifesting on the Internet
can be harsher in tone than hostility manifesting through more
conventional means, making it even more difficult to strike the right
balance between student free speech rights and the need for increased
school regulatory authority.
The speech at issue in a large number of student free speech cases is
banned because it mocks, criticizes, or embarrasses a school official.
Students are continuing to find new ways to vent their frustration over
school officials and are doing so on their own time through the Internet.
In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, a district court granted
summary judgment to a student who was suspended after making a "top
ten" list about the school athletic director, which included insulting
statements about his genitals. 79 The Killion court ultimately found that
the school district failed to demonstrate that a substantial disruption had
occurred as a result of the student's speech, and that there was no
evidence in the record to suggest that the teachers were incapable of
teaching or controlling their classes after the speech. 80
Similarly, in Layshock v. HermitageSchool District, the Third Circuit
sided with a student who created a fake Internet profile of his high
school principal that included a photograph of the principal copied from
the school district's website. 8 1 In Layshock, the Third Circuit repudiated
the idea that a school, absent exceptional circumstances, could "reach
into" a student's home to re22late his conduct in the same way it could
during normal school hours. 2 Student free speech cases involving this
have reached the circuit court level have involved this type of speech).
75. Id. at 618 (noting that the issue has exploded in the digital age, given the prevalence of
communicating via the Internet).
76. Id. at 592.
77. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that a school could not
punish students for distributing an off-campus satirical newspaper that made fun of teachers); see also
Waldman, supra note 4, at 619 (noting that in the pre-Internet age, courts could easily rely on
geographic boundaries).
78. See Waldman, supranote 4, at 592.
79. Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
80. Id. at 455-56 (rejecting the school board's argument that the anger teachers felt over the list
constituted a substantial disruption).
81. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
82. Id. at 216 (noting that it would be an uneasy and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in
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type of speech are very common. 83
They illustrate the wide
disagreement between courts and school officials on the extent of a
school's regulatory authority over off-campus student conduct. School
officials often believe they are justified in punishing students for offcampus speech that embarrasses, mocks, or criticizes a teacher, while
courts are usually unwilling to leave such speech unprotected.
Certainly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern a student's true

intent behind speech that may be aimed at everything from harassment
to harmless mocking. Young students using the Internet to vent their
frustration or poke fun at a teacher may not know when they have gone
too far. Taking all of this into consideration, school administrators are
placed in a difficult position when attempting to protect their students
and teachers from the cascade of existential threats without exceeding

their legal authority. Unfortunately, the varying tests established by
lower courts for determining when Tinker's substantial disruption prong
has been satisfied,84 and the different ways in which lower courts have
approached student free speech cases, add to the uncertainty for school
officials. The inconsistent outcomes, circuit splits, and reversals coming
out of the judiciary provide little assistance and leave administrators
searching for more guidance.85
III. TAYLOR BELL'S RAP SONG AND THE ENSUING LEGAL BATTLE
A. Taylor Bell's Story

Taylor Bell's story is the latest controversy in a long saga of student
free speech cases. In August of 2010, Taylor Bell was a senior at
Itawamba Agricultural School. 86 Bell was also an aspiring musician,
pursuing music since his childhood. 87 During his senior year, several of

Bell's friends told him that two male teachers at the school had made
the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child's home and control his or her actions).
83. See, e.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (school's decision to punish
a student who created a Facebook group titled that a certain teacher was the worst she'd ever met was
ruled unconstitutional); see e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that a
student's free speech rights were violated when a school expelled students who created a satirical
newspaper off-campus).
84. Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3401 (noting that "lower courts have developed several
threshold standards for determining the circumstances under which the Tinker standard may permit
school regulation of off-campus speech).
85. Brief for National School Boards Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 3,
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (No. 06-279).
86. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (N.D. Miss. 2012).
87. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 282-83 (5th Cir. 2014); Brief of Appellants at
10, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd. (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-60264) (at the time, Bell had not had any
serious disciplinary infractions in four years, including no fights and no charges of insubordination).
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sexually charged comments towards them and had touched them

inappropriately on multiple occasions. 88 While Bell did not report these
complaints to school authorities, 89 he did turn to his rap music to vent
his frustration over what was happ ening. He also hoped that his music
would shed light on the problem.

During winter break, Bell composed and recorded a rap song about
the sexual misconduct allegations at a recording studio unaffiliated with

the school.92 In the song, Bell criticizes, in a rather vulgar and hostile
manner,9 3 the two male teachers that were the subjects of the

allegations. 94 After Bell finished recording the song, he uploaded it to
his Facebook profile from his home computer. 95 At no point did Bell
play or discuss the song at school. 96 School regulations blocked
Facebook on school computers and students were prohibited from
97
accessing it and other similar sites on their phones at school.
Eventually, one of the accused teachers became aware of the song and
watched it on another student's phone during school hours. 98 This was

the only documented instance of someone listening to Bell's song at
school. 99

School officials, including the school district's attorney, questioned

Bell about the song and the allegations contained in it. 100 Bell was sent

home for the day without receiving a clear explanation as to why such
steps were being taken. 10 1 The school was closed until Friday of the
88. Id. at 283 (the record contains affidavits from female students stating that one of the teachers
had told another student that she had a "big butt" and that he would date her if she were older; she also
stated that one of the teachers had looked down her shirt; another student said that one of the coaches
had rubbed her ears).
89. Id. at 283, 287 (during the disciplinary hearing, Bell stated that he did not bring these
complaints to school authorities because the school's authorities had a history of ignoring such
complaints).
90. Id. at 283.
91. Id. at 287.
92. Id. at 283.
93. For an excerpt from Bell's rap song, see Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 28485 (5th Cir. 2014) reprinted at infra Appendix A.
94. Id. at 283 (the song discussed the specific allegations made against the teachers).
95. Id. at 285; Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 385 (5th Cir. 2015) (en bane) (a
screenshot of Bell's Facebook profile page shows that the rap song was open to and viewable by the
public).
96. Bell, 774 F.3d at 285.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 285-86 (the accused teacher's wife confronted him about the song after hearing about it
from a friend).
99. Brief of Appellants at 14, Bell v. Itawamba County Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (No. 12-60264)
(5th Cir. 2014).
100. Bell, 774 F.3d at 286 (the principal, superintendent, and school district's attorney held a
meeting with Bell to discuss the song).
101. Id.
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following week, during which time Bell uploaded a polished version 10of2
the song to YouTube, with a brief monologue at the conclusion.
When Bell returned to school on Friday, the principal informed
him that
10 3
he was being suspended, pending a disciplinary hearing.
At the hearing, Bell was again asked about the song and his
motivations for writing it. 10 4 Bell responded by saying that he was
concerned with the teachers' misconduct and did not believe that school
authorities were properly addressing the issue. 10 5 He also reassured the
committee that the song was a form of artistic expression and that he
had no intention of harming the teachers or encouraging anyone else to
threaten, harm, or harass them. 106 Furthermore, Bell told the committee
that he did not tell anybody to listen to the song at school; there was no
evidence that anyone had played the song at school, aside from the one
incident involving the accused teacher.1 0 None of the Itawamba school
officials brought up the possibility that Taylor's song disrupted the
school; their main focus at the hearing was whether
Taylor's song
10 8
threatened, harassed, or intimidated school officials.
The day after the disciplinary hearing, the committee rendered its
decision. 109 Bell's suspension was upheld and he was placed in an
alternative school for the remainder of the grading period. 110 A letter
was sent to Bell's parents informing them of the committee's conclusion
that Bell's song harassed and intimidated the teachers in violation of
school board policy.11 1 In February 2011, Bell's parents filed a civil
action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi, alleging that the school board violated Bell's First
Amendment right to freedom of speech by suspending him for the rap

102. Id. (the monologue read as follows: "It's ...something that's been going on... for a long
time that I just felt like I needed to address. I'm an artist . . . I speak real life experience... I'm going
to have a child. If something like this was going on with my child .. it'd be 4:30... that's just how it
is).
103. Id.
104. Id.at 287 (the school district's attorney stated that the purpose of the hearing was to
determine whether Bell had threatened, intimidated, and/or harassed one or more school teachers).
105. Bell, 774 F.3d at 287; Reply Brief of Appellants, at 7, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774
F.3d 280 (No. 12-60264) (5th Cir. 2014) (At the school board hearing, Bell did provide school board
officials with affidavits from the alleged victims corroborating Bell's accusations against the teachers).
106. Bell, 774 F.3d at 287 (Bell did, however, concede that the lyrics could lead to the possibility
of a parent or relative retaliating against one of the teachers).
107. Id. at 287-88 (there was no evidence presented that any student or the staff had listened to the
song on-campus).
108. Reply Brief of Appellants, at 6, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (No. 1260264) (5th Cir. 2014).
109. Bell, 774 F.3d at 288.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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song.

112

The district court held a hearing for Bell's requested preliminary

injunction, during which a number of different witnesses testified. l r 3
The testimony of the two accused teachers differed with respect to
whether they felt threatened by the song. 114 However, both teachers
testified that Bell's song affected them by changing how they interacted
with students. 115 At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the school board. 116 Relying on
the framework promulgated in Tinker, the district court found that: (1)
Bell's speech caused a material and/or substantial disruption at the
school and; (2) it was reasonably foreseeable
to school officials that the
117
song would cause such a disruption.
A divided panel on the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision on a number of grounds, and most importantly, held that
Tinker's less protective standard does not apply to Bell's off-campus
speech.1 18 According to the court, even if Tinker would apply to the offcampus speech, the evidence did not demonstrate that there was a
substantial disruption, or that such a disruption was foreseeable by
school authorities. 119 Employing a standard less deferential to the
school board, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the school board's
decision could not be removed from judicial scrutiny simply because the
board determined, pursuant to its own policy, that the song's lyrics
constituted harassment.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit rejected the school
board's claim that Bell's song could have been viewed as a threat, given
the "rhetorical" nature of the rap song.121

112. Id. at 289 (The lawsuit named as defendants; (a) the Itawamba County School Board; (b) the
superintendent (individually and in her official capacity); and (c) the principal (individually and in his
official capacity)).
113. Id. at 289-90.
114. Id. at 289 (One teacher testified that the song was "just a rap, not to be taken seriously" and
that if he had just "let it go, it probably would have died down," but the other teacher testified that he
took the lyrics "literally" and that he felt "scared.").
115. Bell, 774 F.3d at 289 (One teacher testified that he became more "cautious" around students;
the other teacher testified that he avoided interactions that might have been seen as "inappropriate.").
116. Id. at290.
117. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 (N.D. Miss. 2012).
118. Bell, 774 F.3d 280.
119. Id. at 291, 295 (The court supported this conclusion by citing to the school board's own
acknowledgment that students were not listening to or discussing the song during school hours and the
teacher's admission that most of the students seemed to be acting "normal" after the song came out.).
120. Id. at 293, 297 (stating that "school officials cannot circumvent their burden of showing that
a substantial disruption occurred . . . simply by adopting a policy that categorizes certain speech as a
severe or substantial disruption without any reasonable factual predicate that such speech would likely
lead to substantial disruption") (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504,
511 (1969)).
121. Id. at 300, 303 (According to the Fifth Circuit, this was underscored by the Disciplinary
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B. The Fifth Circuit'sEn Banc Decision
After a divided Fifth Circuit granted summary judgment for Bell, an
en banc review of the case was granted.122 The Fifth Circuit first had to
determine whether Tinker's substantial disruption test applied to Bell's
rap song. 12 3 In its analysis, the court acknowledged that the advent of
the Internet makes the tasks of evaluating threats and protecting students
even more challenging for administrators because students can now
disseminate and access a potentially threatening or disruptive message
anywhere and anytime. 124 Citing Fifth Circuit precedent,a 25 and that of
other circuits, the Fifth Circuit found that Tinker could apply to offcampus speech in some circumstances. 126 However, the Fifth Circuit's
panel declined to adopt a specific rule governing when Tinker would
apply to off-campus speech and instead relied, in part, on Bell's
admission that he intentionally directed his song towards the school
community to hold that Tinker applied. 12 7 This finding was predicated
on the notion that the intent of the student speaker matters when
determining whether Tinker applies. 128 The Fifth Circuit buttressed this
finding by positing that the advent of the Internet has "obfuscated the
on-campus/off-campus distinction,"' 129 thus making it impracticable 13to
0
separate online student speech from the school community.
Essentially, Bell's song was directed at the school community because
he intended for members of the school community to hear it and posted
the song online to achieve this end, 13 1 even though Bell never attempted
to physically "bring"
132 the speech into the schoolhouse gate by accessing
the song at school.
According to the court, the application of Tinker
was also warranted because the lyrics in the rap song constitute threats,
harassment, and intimidation, as a reasonable layperson would

Committee's own determination that Bell's song may have constituted only a "vague threat.").
122. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (the only issue before
the court was Bell's First Amendment claim).
123. Id. at 391-92.
124. Id. at 392-93.
125. Id. at 393-94 (discussing Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th
Cir. 1972) (applying Tinker to students who were distributing a newspaper near campus, but not on
campus)).
126. Id. at 394-95.
127. Bell, 799 F. 3d at 394-95.
128. Id. at 395 (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding
that Tinker did not apply because a book containing threatening drawings was brought to school
accidentally by the student's brother and thus, the student did not intend to bring the book to school)).
129. Id. at 395-96.
130. See id.
131. Id. (noting that Bell admitted that he knew people were going to listen to his song).
132. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 296 (5th Cir. 2014).
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understand the terms. 133 In sum, the majority concluded that Tinker
applied to the unique facts of Bell's case because Bell's rap song was
directed at the school community
and contained threatening, harassing,
134
and intimidating lyrics.
The next question the Fifth Circuit addressed was whether Tinker's
substantial disruption test was satisfied. 135 In answering this question,

the court awarded deference to the school board, noting that school
136
boards are in the best position to balance discipline and expression.
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that Tinker's substantial disruption test

was satisfied because the school board's decision to suspend Bell-on
the grounds that his conduct could have led to a substantial disruptionwas objectively reasonable. 137 In support of this conclusion, the court
emphasized that Bell's lyrics were interpreted as threats by the named

school officials, which was a direct violation of the school district's

policy, 138 and also made it more difficult for the named teachers to do
their jobs. 139 Despite considerable pressure from outside groups to hear

the
case, 14 thewithin
Supreme
Court courts.
denied 14writ
of certiorari, leaving in place
1
the status quo
the lower
IV. DISCUSSION

The Fifth Circuit's underlying rationale for applying Tinker's
substantial disruption standard to Bell's speech is twofold: (1) precedent
establishes that Tinker can apply to off-campus speech in some

circumstances; and (2) Bell intended to direct his speech at the school
community and therefore, Tinker applies Bell's speech. The court also
133. Bell, 799 F.3d at 396 (finding that the school board only had to show that the interpretation
was reasonable; unlike proving that a threat qualified as a "true threat," intention of the speaker was
irrelevant).
134. Id. at 394.
135. Id. at 397.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 398-99.
138. Id. (finding that although a court cannot rely on ipse dixit in evaluating the school board's
actions, a policy violation can be used as evidence to support the reasonable forecast of a future
substantial disruption).
139. Id. at 399-400 (noting that teachers are the cornerstone of education and that without
teaching, there can be no education).
140. See, e.g., Brief of Erik Nielson, Charis E. Kurbin, Travis L. Gosa, Michael Render (aka
Killer Mike) and Other Scholars and Artists as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner on Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch.
Bd., On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (No.
15-666), 2015 WL 9315591; see also Brief of Advancement Project and One Voice as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., (No. 15-666), 2015 WL 9315592.
141. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S.Ct. 1166 (2016).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

concluded that Bell's speech was threatening and harassing, as
understood by a reasonable person, and thereby comports with the
general principles of Tinker's less protective standard. Although the
Fifth Circuit explicitly declined to adopt a bright line rule, its reasoning
ostensibly established the following rule: When off-campus speech is
reasonably interpreted as threatening, harassing, or intimidating and is
directed at the school community, it is subject to Tinker's less protective
standard. 142 According to the Fifth Circuit, Bell intended for his speech
to reach the school community because it mentioned school officials by
name and was posted online where the school community could access
it anywhere and anytime. Additionally, Bell's speech reasonably could
be interpreted as threatening. Thus, Bell's speech satisfied this rule.
A. Qualifying Tinker's Application to Off-Campus Speech by Requiring
a Requisite Form of Intent to Reach the School Community Is
Problematicand Unworkable
The Fifth Circuit qualified its application of Tinker to Bell's speech
by emphasizing that Bell possessed the intent to reach the school
community while operating off-campus, thereby suggesting that intent
to reach the school community is necessary for application of Tinker to
off-campus speech. The Fifth Circuit based its conclusion that Bell
intended to reach the school community on the grounds that: (1) Bell
expected and wanted other members to watch the video and; (2) the
speech was school-related and online. Attempting to ascertain whether
an off-campus speaker intended for his speech to reach the school
community is a difficult endeavor for courts; it can be speculative and
wildly inaccurate. A student disseminating a message online might not
intend for his speech to reach the physical boundaries of the school, in
the sense that it is delivered to the school in printed form or accessed by
students on school grounds. However, the student may intend to reach
school community members when they are off-campus and online, as
was the case with Bell. Other community members may or may not
access this online speech at school; they may or may not use it to cause
a disruption within the school. This raises an interesting question
unaddressed in the majority opinion: What exactly is the intent that
triggers application of Tinker? Is it the intent of the speaker to reach
community members at any time or place, or the intent to cause a
disruption in the school environment during normal school hours? In its
142. See Bell, 799 F.3d 379 at 401 (Elrod, J., concurring) (noting that Tinker applies in this case
only because the speech was directed at the school and reasonably interpreted as threatening, harassing,
and intimidating); see also id. at 402-3 (Costa, J., concurring) (noting that the decision limits Tinker's
application to those where the speech is threatening, intimidating, or harassing).
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143
opinion, the majority cites Porterv. Ascension Parish School Board.
for the proposition that "a speaker's intention that his speech reaches the
school community, buttressed by his actions in bringing about that
consequence" supports the application of Tinker. But the majority in
Bell did not clearly define "school community" when deciding whether
Bell's speech was intentionally directed at the school community or
whether his actions brought about that consequence. Nevertheless, the
majority's conclusion that the speech was directed at the school
community, combined with its mention of the "everywhere at once"
nature of the Internet, suggests that the definition of "school
community" adopted by the Fifth Circuit is expansive; speech that is
intended to reach community members would fall under the definition,
even if the speaker only intended to reach community members when
they are online and off-campus.
By looking to this type of intent, the Fifth Circuit is essentially
awarding schools heightened authority over any school related offcampus, online conduct, as long as the school board can reasonably
interpret the speech as threatening, harassing, or intimidating. Under the
Fifth Circuit's precedent in Bell, any intent to reach school community
members off-campus is synonymous with intent to reach the school
community as a whole. Bell admitted that he intended to reach the
school community, but students using the Internet as a platform to
discuss school related matters are always intending to reach other
community members unless they engage in private conversations with
non-community members. Qualifying Tinker's application by requiring
intent to reach the school community or other community members is
therefore a meaningless qualification that leaves most off-campus
speech unprotected. It defeats the purpose of using the Internet as an
outlet to discuss school-related topics without fear of the school exerting
control over it.
Such an expansion of Tinker's less protective standard fails to provide
adequate safeguards to students, who are increasingly turning to the
online world to discuss school-related topics. It also runs afoul of the
Supreme Court's limitation of Tinker to the "schoolhouse gate." The
effect is to chill and constrain student off-campus expression. The Fifth
Circuit, by concluding that Bell intended to reach the school community,
is essentially treating the Internet differently than any other platform in
light of its "everywhere and anywhere" nature. It tells students that they
need to be careful about what they say online because online speech is
ubiquitous. This effectively negates the primary benefits of the Internet.

143. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that speech was
protected when a notebook with violent depictions was brought to a school by the speaker's younger
brother on the grounds that the speaker never intended for the drawing to reach the school).
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Under Bell's precedent, student online speakers cannot take advantage
of the ease and convenience of disseminating a message online without
considering how the school might interpret it. In finding that intent to
disseminate a school related message online is synonymous with intent
to reach the school community, the Fifth Circuit has turned this
advantage into a disadvantage. While it may be suggested that this
concept of intent can be narrowed to exclude other cases where, for
example, students may not intend to reach all school members but only a
few, this limitation is unfeasible. Given the nature of the Internet, a
message thrown into the ubiquitous, unpredictable online world is
accessible to anyone. But this accessibility does not mean that the
message will in fact be accessed by every community member. In many
cases, the number of community members an online speaker intends to
reach would be unascertainable for courts, as it is hard to predict for
even the speaker.
Conversely, instead of looking at a speaker's intent to reach the
school community, courts could view the requisite intent for application
of Tinker as the speaker's intent to disrupt the school community during
normal school hours. While this approach could lead to a more
protective standard for students, the intent is still difficult to ascertain.
For example, Taylor Bell did not intend for his rap song to be accessed
at school.' 44 In fact, the record contained only one incident where the
song was played at school, at the request of a teacher. But Bell surely
anticipated that the accusations he publicized in his song would be heard
by students1 45 and reverberate throughout the school during normal
school hours. Moreover, it was foreseeable that students would gossip
about the song and the accusations contained in it, interact differently
with the accused teachers, and potentially express anger. However,
these types of reactions do not rise to the level of a substantial disruption
warranting punishment.
Furthermore, any actions from other parties reasonably foreseeable to
Bell are too attenuated to hold him accountable for them. Students
cannot be expected to anticipate that other students will, upon hearing
their expressive conduct, respond in an unlawful manner during normal
school hours. They cannot be held responsible when community
members access the online speech and, acting on their own accord,
facilitate disruptions unintended by the speaker. In retrospect, a
144. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 285 (5th Cir. 2014) (Bell testified that he
never encouraged anyone at school-students or staff-to listen to the song and that he never played the
song at school; this leads to an inference that he did not intend for the song to be accessed at school).
145. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 386 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (When
questioned during the disciplinary hearing, Bell admitted that he knew students would hear the song
because it was on Facebook, and that nearly 2,000 people had contacted him about the song.).
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speaker's intent may be viewed as congruent with a disrupter's-more
aligned than what it actually was at the time the message was formed
and disseminated. The fact that a disruption occurred from a third party
should not be used to support a finding that the speaker intended such a
disruption. There may be cases where a speaker's intent to cause a
disruption during school hours is clear. For example, a speaker may tell
another student to carry out an act that would qualify as a substantial
disruption. But these cases would be the exception, not the norm.
Usually, the intent of an expressive speaker will be less clear. A student
in Bell's position should not be hesitant to disseminate an important
message online, in the form they choose, for fear that they will be held
accountable if someone drastically overacts to the message.
For these reasons, the consideration of a speaker's intent when they
disseminate speech off-campus is nebulous; it involves too many
unascertainable variables and thus, can be unfair to the speaker.
Application of a less protective standard should not turn on whether an
off-campus speaker intended to reach the school community or cause a
disruption. Courts should not consider an off-campus speaker's intent
and instead, should limit the application of Tinker to situations where
the speech is physically brought on to school grounds. The Fifth
Circuit's holding effectively eliminates any meaningful barrier between
the school environment and the home environment. The Supreme Court
has, as recently as 2007, suggested that this barrier should remain in
place. 146
B. Allowing Application of Tinker to Off-Campus Speech to Turn on a
Question of ReasonablenessIs Unfairto Students and
Removes Needed Protection

Some may argue that off-campus speakers receive enough protection
under the Fifth Circuit's precedent because the school board's
interpretation of the speech as threatening, harassing, or intimidating
must be reasonable for Tinker to apply. Some disagreeing with the final
outcome in Bell may argue that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
Bell's speech was not reasonable. However, these arguments overlook
the high degree of deference that is-and must be-awarded to school
boards when courts consider reasonableness and the extent to which
certain forms of speech are subject to different reasonable
interpretations.
Rap music is perhaps the perfect example to illustrate the latter point.
146. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Roberts stressed that the school's disciplinary action over a student who hung up a banner was justified
only because it occurred at a school-sponsored event.).
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Rap music, especially when traced to its "gangsta rap" origin, can be
inherently violent, vulgar, and hyperbolic.
Indeed, rap culture has

emerged with its own set of norms and a unique identity.
Yet many
people do not understand or empathize with rap culture and
consequently, view the culture in a negative light. 149 In fact, courts have

traditionally viewed rap music negatively. 15# The lyrics contained in
Bell's rap song, when taken out of context or viewed by someone

unfamiliar with rap music, could reasonably be interpreted as threats.
But Bell, an aspiring rapper, wrote the lyrics in the context of a rap song

and, more broadly, a rap culture. Because of the school board's
presumable lack of familiarity with rap music, its interpretation was not
unreasonable.
The reasonableness of its interpretation is further
supported by the motivations--explicit or not--of the school board to
put student safety ahead of everything else and its vested interest in
suppressing controversy. Bell's interpretation and the school board's

both were reasonable. As Judge Dennis points out in his dissent,
"reasonable minds may differ about when speech qualifies as
threatening, harassing or intimidating." 15 1 In other words, one man's

rap lyric is another man's threat.

Herein lies the problem: any

reasonable interpretation of a student's off-campus speech as
threatening, harassing, or intimidating will make it subject to Tinker's

less protective standard. This ruling forces students to predict how a
school board might reasonably interpret their off-campus speech.
Students should not be placed in this difficult position, nor should they
have their speech quelled because of fears that a reasonable
interpretation-often influenced by an imperative to keep students

safe-might beget punishments down the road.

The application of

147. See Edward G. Armstrong, Gangsta Misogyny: A Content Analysis of the Portrayals of
Violence Against Women in Rap Music, 1987-1993, 8(2) J. OF CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 96, 96
(2001) (discussing a finding that twenty-two percent of gangsta rap music songs contain violent and
misogynist lyrics); see also Bell, 774 F.3d at 299 (noting that Bell's song contains violent imagery
typical of the hyperbolic rap genre).
148. See Jason E. Powell, R.A.P.: Rule Against Perps (Who Write Rhymes), 41 RUTGERS L. J.
479, 483-84 (2009) (briefly discussing the evolution of rap music). For an in-depth discussion of the
evolution of rap and hip hop culture, see Becky Blanchard, The Social Significance of Rap and Hip Hop
Culture, ETHICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (July 26, 1999),
http://web.stanford.edu/class/e297c/poverty_prejudice/mediarace/socialsignificance.htm.
149. See Tracy L. Reilly, Debunking the Top Three Myths of DigitalSampling: An Endorsement
of the Bridgeport Music Court's Attempt to Afford "Sound" CopyrightProtection to Sound Recordings,
31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 355, 382-83 (2008) (noting that rap music often reflects a generation of black
youth, something that white people do not understand and as a result, attempt to suppress).
150. See Powell, supranote 148, at 480 (noting that rap music is a foreign language to courts, and
accordingly, is perceived negatively).
151. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 418 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric") (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 25 (1971)).
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Tinker to off-campus student speech based on whether a school board's
interpretation of the speech was reasonable strips away protection for
students in a way that is antithetical to First Amendment principles.
C. Other Problems and Concerns with Applying Tinker to
Off-Campus Speech
Allowing courts to continue the trend of applying Tinker to offcampus speech will allow schools to cast a wide net over student online
speech. The rationale underlying Tinker's less protective standard is
predicated on advancing goals relating to the "special characteristics of
the school environment,"' 52 including the need to maintain order and
protect the educational process. 153 But the Supreme Court has never
suggested that the purpose of school regulation of speech is to control
what students hear or say. 154 While schools maintain an interest in
protecting their students from threats or problems originating offcampus that may overflow to campus, this interest, and Tinker's
underlying rationale, are weaker when the speech originates off-campus
and is never "brought in" to the school.
Applying Tinker to offcampus online speech enables schools to paternalistically control what
their students hear and say when they are off-campus. It replaces
parental authority to discipline and monitor a child with the school's
authority, 156 and additionally, deprives students of the right to engage in
constitutionally protected activities that are at the center of our core
democratic principles-activities such as satire, criticism, mockery, and,
in Taylor Bell's case, hyperbolic rap music.
What type of off-campus speech constitutes a "substantial disruption"
under Tinker is a difficult question for lower courts and school
administrators to answer. School administrators may envision a
definition that is much broader than a court's definition because of a
school's vested interest in suppressing controversy. As the Third Circuit
in JS.ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School, District put it, adopting a

152. Tinker v.Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S 503, 506 (1969).
153. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
154. Brief for Appellants at 10, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (No. 12-60264),
2015 WL 1814763.
155. Brief for Student Press Law Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, at11, Bell v.
Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-60264), 2012 WL 2374248 (arguing that
one of the reasons that off-campus speech and on-campus speech are treated differently is that oncampus speakers are a captive audience, whereas off-campus speakers are not).
156. Brief for Mary Beth Tinker as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, at 14, Bell v. Itawamba
Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-60264), 2015 WL 1607912 ("Given the primary
role of parents, one could argue that school officials have no business punishing students for off-campus
speech unless someone affirmatively brings it on campus ...").
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less protective standard for certain off-campus speech would "allow
school officials to punish any speech by a student that takes place
anywhere, at any time, as long as it is about the school or a school
official, is brought to the attention of the school official, and is deemed
offensive by the prevailing authority."' 157 Furthermore, a school board
might, as was the case in Bell, justify its punishment by claiming a
substantial disruption, even though such a claim never appeared until
litigation was brought. 158 Schools can invoke Tinker retroactively to
mask the true motivation behind a punishment: a content based
suppression based on dissatisfaction with the speaker's message. This
punishment might be imposed to protect the image of a school official.
Tinker's flexibility and deference toward school boards make it easy for
schools to do this; it would be harder for school districts to retroactively
invoke a more protective standard.
Because the Internet transcends physical boundaries, it might seem
strange to even categorize certain online speech as either "off-campus"
or "on-campus." It can be argued that this transcendence leads to a false
dichotomy and undermines any attempt to create two different standards
for online speech. The following scenario demonstrates how strange the
dichotomy can seem: student A posts a Facebook message on his phone
poking fun at a school official during his car ride home while student B
posts the same message in his gym class. Employing two different
standards for student A and student B could, some might argue, be
unfair in that scenario. But this distinction is nevertheless an important
one. Taylor Bell never attempted to access or play his rap song at
school. Had Taylor Bell made a deliberate attempt to bring the song
into school by playing his rap song to other students during school
hours, the analysis would have changed completely. One would be hard
pressed to maintain that Bell would not be more culpable if he accessed
the song at school. Furthermore, using cell phones during school hours
is a violation of school rules, meaning that students who access their
online speech at school are already causing a disruption pursuant to
school policy. Undoubtedly there will be scenarios where the degree of
culpability for a student speaker differs depending on whether that
student made a deliberate attempt to disseminate his online speech on
school grounds by accessing it. Thus, applying two different standards
to on-campus and off-campus speech is not as counterintuitive as some
157. J.S.
v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that a school's
decision to punish a student who created a fake Internet profile for the school principal was
unconstitutional because there was no substantial disruption).
158. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 288 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that no evidence
was presented at the disciplinary hearing to indicate that the song had caused a disruption; at the end of
the hearing, one committee member told Bell, "I would censor your material ... because everybody
doesn't really listen to that kind of stuff... don't put all of those bad words in it.").
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may contend.
D. Schools Have OtherAlternatives to Tinker
The right to express an unfavorable opinion is deeply rooted in our
nation's history and a staple of our democracy. 159 Given that one of a
public school's many goals is to prepare students for adult life,
suppressing speech like Taylor Bell's sends students the wrong
message; it is a message that does not reflect the realities of adult life or
teach students that the right to express such speech is cherished and
celebrated in our society. Instead, it tells students that if they want to
speak out on a public issue, it must be done in a way that will not be
interpreted as hostile, vulgar, or offensive. This message conflicts with
one of the main goals of public education: teaching students the values
of citizenship that are necessary for our democracy to function. 160 In
fact, as some commentators have pointed out, a school's hostility
towards student dissent most likely stems from an unwillingness to view
children as citizens, as well as a reluctance to operate the school in
a
1 61
way that fosters a practical understanding of constitutional principles.'
In most circumstances, it is easier for school officials to punish a
student for vulgar off-campus dissent in an efficient, authoritarian way.
But this type of approach bypasses the difficult, yet more appropriate
method for dealing with dissent: engaging with the student to discern his
motive for expressing the speech and discussing potential solutions in a
constructive way that fosters an understanding of a democratic response
to dissent. 162 By doing this, schools can engender a more inclusive
environment where students' concerns and perspectives are embraced,
not repressed. When a problem manifests from student dissent, school
officials should refrain from taking the easy route, and instead, should
find ways to address the speech that do not infringe upon the student's
right to express such speech outside of the school.
Schools are
undoubtedly equipped with the tools and minds needed to propose
alternatives to harsh punishment and suppression. Additionally, if
159. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) ("In our system,
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the
views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
must take this risk.").
160. See Sullivan, supra note 69, at 696-97 (noting that public schools are valued by society
because they instill in students a common set of core principles and values, such as respect, honesty,
citizenship, responsibility, and integrity; public schools were established to teach students how to
exercise their democratic rights as citizens and cultivate a sense of nationalism.).
161. See Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Inside Voices: Protecting the Student-Critic in Public
Schools, 62 AM. U.L. REV. 253, 254-55 (2012).
162. See id. at 255.
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student speech crosses a legal line so as to remove it from normal
constitutional protection, it can be dealt with through criminal
enforcement or civil remedies. This may be the case if it asserts

falsehoods in a way that would constitute defamation or is interpreted as
imminently threatenin 63and consequently punishable through the
criminal justice system.
One often-cited concern is that taking away a school's ability to
invoke Tinker will render schools powerless to deal with problems such
as bullying and school-related violence. Without Tinker applying to offcampus speech, some argue, a school may be unable to take preemptive
action against a student who threatens, harasses, or intends to harm a
school official. However, even without Tinker, there are a number of
ways for schools to address these problems. First and foremost, many
states have enacted anti-bullying legislation aimed at enabling and/or
mandating schools to take action against bullying. 164 The U.S.
Department of Education also has renewed its dedication to eliminating
bullying by reminding educators that certain federal statutes may be
invoked when addressing a bullying issue. 165 Accordingly, a school can
utilize legislation to combat cyberbullying, as long as the speech in
question meets the requirements laid out in such legislation.
Cyberbullying laws would apply to a narrow category of speech,
therefore leaving certain forms of expressive speech, such as Taylor
Bell's rap song, untouched.
E. A More ProtectiveStandardfor Off-Campus Speech

Schools also can deal with threats and school-violence originating
off-campus without invoking the Tinker standard to justify their
decisions. In Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District, the Fifth

Circuit upheld a school board's decision to expel a student who brought
a notebook to class that described his plans to commit a Columbinestyle attack on the school. 166 In cases where there is a strong reason to
believe that a student intends to inflict grievous harm on a school, few
would argue that speech evincing the student's intent should be
163. Brief for Student Press Law Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee, at 3-4, Bell v.
Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-60264), 2012 WL 2374248.
164. Matthew Fenn, Symposium: The Goals of Antitrust: Note: A Web of Liability: Does New
Cyberbullying LegislationPut Public Schools in a Sticky Situation?, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2729, 2737
(2013) (noting that forty-nine out of fifty states have enacted some type of antibullying legislation).
165. Id. at 2739 (noting that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, color, or national origin; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex. Thus, if bullying is based on any of these protected classes, the
federal statute may be implicated.).
166. 508 F.3d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 2007).
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protected. The question becomes: what type of standard would validate
a school board's decision to take preemptive action to prevent a student
from carrying out a violent attack on a school?
It is not hard to imagine a standard more protective than Tinker
which, if met, would validate a school's decision in this type of
scenario. In fact, the Ponce court stated that such speech is not
protected because it, "poses a direct and demonstrable threat of violence
unique to the school environment." 167 In Ponce, the court declined to
apply Tinker to speech that "gravely and uniquely threatens violence
168
including massive deaths, to the school's population as a whole."
The Fifth Circuit's language and holding in Ponce suggests that a
separate standard can be crafted to handle speech that poses a serious
threat to the safety of the students and the school. While Ponce did not
explicitly establish a new standard, it demonstrates that such a standard
can exist independently of Tinker. Under such a standard, a court would
have to find that there is a strong interest in preventing physical danger
to students. 169 Unlike the speech at issue in Bell, which was subjected
to a deferential standard of reasonableness with respect to the school's
interpretation, the speech at issue in Ponce evinced a more obvious
intention to inflict harm on the school. Conduct that may be unprotected
under Tinker's substantial disruption standard, such as Bell's rhetorical
rap song, would not rise to the level of conduct that would satisfy a
standard derived from the language used in Ponce. Even without the
formation of a new, independent standard, courts can draw from this
type of language when dealing with off-campus speech. Adoption of
this more protective standard would notify schools that they cannot
suppress a student's off-campus speech unless the speaker's intent to
harm the school is obvious or the speech poses a grave danger to the
school. Thus, a school would know that its decision to punish a student
for his off-campus speech could not hinge on unfounded fears or on
fears over speech subject to multiple reasonable interpretations. By
establishing that schools must go beyond a mere showing of
reasonableness, courts would send the clear message that certain forms
of off-campus speech-such as mockery, criticism, and expressive
conduct-do not fall outside of First Amendment protection.
167. Id. at 771-72.
168. Id. at 772.
169. Brief for Mary Beth Tinker as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, at 15-16, Bell v.
Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-60264) (arguing that the case should be
decided under the narrow exception to Tinker carved out in Ponce, whereby the school can prohibit
Bell's speech only if there is a strong interest in preventing physical danger to the students that might be
incited by the rap); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424-25 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring)
("Due to the special features of the school environment, school officials must have greater authority to
intervene before speech leads to violence.").
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While much uncertainty still surrounds Tinker's application to offcampus speech, one thing is clear: lower courts have applied Tinker to
certain off-campus speech in different situations and with different
qualifications. Bell presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
decide a student free speech case involving off-campus speech. The
Court should have taken advantage of that opportunity and declared that
off-campus speech is not subject to Tinker's less protective standard.
Such a holding would have limited Tinker's application to on-campus
speech in a way that is consistent with its original holding and
underlying rationale. By not doing so, the Supreme Court has allowed
the uncertainty surrounding off-campus speech to persist and failed to
remedy the erosion of First Amendment rights for students in the offcampus setting.
V. CONCLUSION

The question of when a school can take measures to punish a student
for his off-campus speech is a controversial one. It involves a
confrontation between freedom of speech principles and the needs of
schools to tackle emerging problems that have the potential to
negatively impact the school and its students. The advent of the Internet
has created a new platform for student speakers, raising new questions
about the reach of school authority and the protections that off-campus,
online speakers should be given. It has forced a reevaluation of the
standards by which student speech is traditionally evaluated. Student
online speech shows no signs of slowing down any time soon, nor does
the litigation involving such speech. Taylor Bell's rap song was just one
in a long line of student free speech cases. Despite precedent, there is
still a cloud of uncertainty hanging over cases like Bell's because courts
have applied different standards and have reached inconsistent
outcomes.
The Fifth Circuit upheld Bell's suspension on the grounds that his
speech was not protected by the First Amendment. In doing so, the
Fifth Circuit applied Tinker's less protective standard because Bell's
speech could reasonably be interpreted as threatening and Bell intended
for his speech to reach the school community. This Casenote has argued
that the Fifth Circuit's approach in Bell should be repudiated for a
number of reasons. First and foremost, the consideration of a student's
intent to reach the school community is nebulous and unfair to the
student. Considering a student's intent to reach the school community
with off-campus, online speech is antithetical to the foundations of
Tinker's less protective standard.
Secondly, a standard of
reasonableness is deferential and all-encompassing.
Therefore,
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application of Tinker's less protective standard should not turn on
whether a court finds that a school's interpretation was reasonable. The
problems with the Fifth Circuit's approach and its justifications for
narrowly applying Tinker under the circumstances demonstrate that
Tinker cannot be extended to off-campus speech in a way that
adequately safeguards the rights of students disseminating speech offcampus. For this reason, a bright line rule prohibiting the application of
Tinker to off-campus speech is necessary. As additional support for this
position, this Casenote has discussed the problems and concerns,
theoretical and practical, of eschewing such a rule. Instead, courts
should adopt a more protective standard for off-campus speech, such as
the "uniquely and gravely threatens violence" standard adopted by the
Fifth Circuit in Ponce.
The digital age has made policing more difficult for schools. Schools
should be given the tools they need to help them police the rapidly
growing digital world and eliminate problems such as cyberbullying and
school-related violence. They already have many tools at their disposal.
However, allowing schools to expand their authority by broadly
extending Tinker to off-campus speech is not the answer. The harms of
this expanded authority greatly outweigh the potential benefits. When
Taylor Bell turned to his rap music to publicize allegations of sexual
assault, he was not worried about how the school might view his music.
He had the expectation that, because the endeavor was on his own time,
the school would not exercise control over it. Bell and other students
are entitled to this expectation.
"The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms
is
nowhere
more
vital than in the community of
170
American schools."
APPENDIX

A:

EXCERPT FROM TAYLOR BELL'S RAP SONG

17 1

Let me tell you a little story about these Itawamba coaches
Dirty ass niggas like some fucking coacha roaches
Startedfucking with the whites and now they fucking with the blacks
That pussy ass nigga Wildmon got me turnedup thefucking max.
Fucking with the students and he just had a baby
Ever since I met that crackerI knew that he was crazy
Always talking shit cause he know I'm from the city
The reason hefucking aroundcause his wife ain't got no titties
This nigga telling students that they sexy, betta watch your back

170. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
171. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 284-85 (5th Cir. 2014).
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I'm a serve this nigga like I serve the junkies with some crack
Quit the damn basketball team / The coach a pervert
Can't stand the truth so to you these lyrics going to hurt
What the hell was they thinking when they hiredMr. Rainey
DreadlockBobby Hill the second/He the same see
Talking about you could have went pro to the NFL
Now you just anotherpervert coach,fat as hell
Talking about you gangsta/Drive your mama's PT Cruiser
Run up on T-Bizzle /I'm going to hityou with my rueger
Think you got some game / Cuz you fucking with some juveniles
You know this shit the truth so don't you try to hide it now
Rubbing on the black girls' ears in the gym
White hoes, changeyour voice when you talk to them
I'm a dope runner,spot ajunkie a mile away
Came to football practice high, remember that day
I do, to me you a fool nigga / 30 years old fucking with students at the
school/ HahahahYou's a lame and it's a damn shame
Insteadyou was lame, eat shit, the whole school got a ring mutherfucker
Heardyou textin' number 25 / You want to get it on
White dude, guess you got a thingfor them yellow bones
Looking down girls'shirts/Drool running down your mouth
You fucking with the wrong one / Going to get a pistol down your mouth
Pow / OMG took some girls in the locker room in PE
Cut off the lights you motherfuckingfreak
Fucking with the youngins /Because yourpimpin game weak
How he get the head coach I don't reallyfucking know
But I still got a lot of love for my nigga Joe
And my niggaMakaveli and my nigga Cody
Wildemon talk shit bitch don't even know me
Middlefingers up ifyou hate that nigga
Middlefingers up ifyou can't stand that nigga
Middlefingers up ifyou want to cap that nigga
Middlefingers up / he get no mercy nigga.
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